Cryptography -the art of secure communications, has been developed at least over 2500 years. Still at present, no perfectly secure as well as practically suitable classical or quantum cryptosystem exist. Statistically encoding the individual bit, here we present a practical key distribution technique which is absolutely secure both for classical and quantum keys. To achieve perfect security, noise has to be strategically introduced. Noise, a detrimental factor, which never becomes helpful anywhere in classical and quantum information theory, can be used as a gift of nature in our cryptosystem since fundamentally the coding of this cipher system does not follow the standard technique of classical and quantum information processing.
In cryptography, only Vernam cipher [1] provides perfect security [2] if the same key, initially shared between the legitimate users, is not used second time. As the same key can not be repeatedly used, it is an impractical cipher system for global use. Due to the non-existence of practically suitable secure cipher system, data encryption standard (DES) [3] and public key distribution (PKD) technique [4] are used as alternative modes of secure communications. The DES and PKD systems do not provide perfect security but can give computational security. To break these systems, code breaker needs computing machine, which is a difficult task for a computer but not so difficult for a chain of computers that has been demonstrated in many ways. As the issue is security one can smell the existence of such network. Perhaps, because of this doubt, Vernam cipher is still routinely used in some diplomatic communications. Moreover, development of faster classical computer or simple quantum computer might challenge the computational security of DES/PKD systems in future. So there was demand for new type of cryptosystem. Around 1970, Wiesner [5] first realised that laws of quantum mechanics can be used to ensure security. Bennett and Brassard shaped this fascinating idea in their BB-84 [6] quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. As an alternative to the BB-84 protocol, Ekert in his EPR protocol showed [7] that in non local quantum mechanics, violation of Bell's inequality can be a signature of eavesdropping. Bypassing Bell's inequality, however, EPR type protocol can be given [8] still Ekert's paper is significant because security issue, for the first time, has been linked with the conceptual problem of quantum mechanics. After that many EPR and non EPR protocols have been proposed [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . As security is ensured by quantum mechanics, it seems to be superior cryptosystem. Guided by this notion, many experiments have been performed [14] [15] [16] although it was known that raw QKD protocols do not provide full security. It's security can be jeopardised due to noise. In recent years, on the basis of classical and quantum error correction methods, security [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] and complete security [22] proofs of QKD protocols have been presented considering i) restricted kind of eavesdropping attacks [17, 18] ii) some particular type of noise models [19] [20] [21] iii) perfectly fault-tolerant quantum computer [22] . But for practical QKD protocols, full security can not be proved [23] [24] . Very recently it has been shown that all existing practical QKD protocols are insecure [25] . Besides practical security crisis, conceptual problem of QKD is that in addition to the quantum channel, it requires classical channel and classical authentication technique to operate. Recently we have shown [26] , completely QKD is also possible relying on quantum channel only. In fact, classical channel and classical authentication technique can not be used in our system.
In our alternative key distribution procedure, two different sequences of quantum or classical states represent two bit values. These two sequences are shared between the legitimate users. Their task is to produce arbitrarily long chain of bits repeatedly using the two shared sequences. It is trivial to mention that repetitive use of our bit values (i.e. sequences) is not ruled out by Shannon theory of secrecy systems [2] . Shannon theory only rules out the repetition of the key not the bit values. In ideal environment, this has already been revealed [26] in our quantum key. To illustrate our procedure, let us present a classical and a quantum key respectively.
The right side column stands for the bit values of the key. This key is prepared by two random sequences of a pair of random orthogonal quantum states. This key is basically a classical key because orthogonal states can be exactly cloned like classical states.
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This key is prepared by two random sequences of two same random non orthogonal quantum states. This is a quantum key because states can not be exactly cloned [27] .
How to break these keys: The knowledge of the full sequences is not necessary to break the keys. It can be broken if identical and non identical bit value sequences can be distinguished taking marginal statistics. The correlation test can simply be done by using any two sequences. In K C , the probability (p ii ) of correlated elements of any two identical bit value sequences is 1 and the probability (p ij ) of correlated elements of any two non identical bit value sequences is 1/2. Therefore p ii = 2p ij . As their ratio is not same, the key can be broken. To break the classical key, measurement does not play any role. In contrast, quantum key can also be broken if sequence of measurements is systematically chosen. Here identical sequence of operations is the best choice. In the above quantum key, as the sequences are prepared by the same pair of non orthogonal states, a POVM (positive operator valued measure) can be used for correlation test. The conclusive information of POVM for both the states will yield p ii = 2p ij . Interestingly this is same for inconclusive information. It means conclusive information is not at all required to break the key. The example: quantum key of two different random sequences of |↔ , | , |ր ւ and |տ ց states. In this key, none of the states can be conclusively distinguished because density matrix of the states |↔ , and | is same with the density matrix of the states |ր ւ and |տ ց . Still identical and non identical sequences of this quantum key can be distinguished by the inconclusive results of individual measurement. Hence both quantum and classical keys are insecure. The is true as all the sequences (the whole key) are available at a time to a code breaker to perform the correlation test. In ideal environment, by quantum authentication (QA) strategy [26] K Q can be made secure but K C is not. In QA strategy, code breaker is allowed to intercept the sequences but if he/she does not resend any sequence, the next sequence will not be sent. Under this constrain, eavesdropper will be forced to introduce error if he/she wants to eavesdrop. The QA will fail in presence of noise. Because of noise, Eavesdropper, without introducing any error, can get some of the elements of every sequence of any quantum keys belonging to our procedure to pursue the correlation test. The advantage of uncertainty principle is lost as noise is present.
As quantum mechanics fails to protect our system, only mathematical method is left. If mathematics can ensure security in presence of noise then it should be applicable both for K Q and K C . The above analysis suggests that system will be perfectly secure, if code breaker does not get any meaningful correlation among the sequences. Or simply if P ii becomes equal to P ij , then all the sequences appears to be identical to a code breaker. But P ii is not equal to P ij so how would we make it equal to the code breakers ? This apparently impossible task can be made possible by effectively introducing error in the elements of the sequences without corrupting the bit value of the sequences. Introduced error does not corrupt the bit values since individual bit is statistically encoded. Of course error can not be arbitrarily high. How much error can be introduced will be dependant on the statistics. If statistics is enough, individual bit can be perfectly recovered from noise without employing error correcting codes. In contrast, in classical (Shannon) or quantum information theory, individual bit is not statistically encoded, so noise necessitates the use of classical or quantum error correcting codes to recover some of the bits.
Firstly we shall describe the error introduction strategy in a simple classical system. The basic idea behind this protocol is that a sequence of one type of element will be corrupted in two different ways to represent two bit values. This is equivalent to choosing two sequences for two bit values. Suppose the sequence is S = {1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . .......}. This sequence can be represented by two different sub sequences (denoted by α and β) of elements 1. S = {α β β α β α β β α α β α.......}, where probability of α position is same with the probability of β position (p α = p β ) in the sequence S. The sub sequences α and β are shared between sender and receiver. Apart from environmental noise these sub sequences of α and β can be further corrupted by two error-introducing systems X and Y. Considering natural error, two different probabilistic error p x and p y can be fixed by X and Y. For bit 0, sender introduces error p x and p y in the sub sequences α and β respectively. Now sequence S can be termed as probabilistic sequence, S p , where each element is denoted by its error probability. S p 0 = {p x p y p y p x p y p x p y p y p x p x p y p x ....} Similarly, for bit 1, error p x and p y will be introduced in the sub sequences β and α respectively, then S p will be S
The key will be:
All rows (columns also) are having same error p z , where p z = 1/2(p x + p y ). The receiver can easily distinguish the bit values of the corrupted sequences as he knows the sub sequences α and β provided bits are statistically distinguishable. But code breaker has to go through the correlation test as he/she does not know the sub sequences α and β. The correlation test will yield p ii = p ij . Our objective has been fulfilled, yet it is not a loophole-free crypto-system because code breaker can get large probability of repetition of the same error sequence of marginal number (say 10) of elements. The identical error sequences carry same bit values because it can only appear for identical probabilistic sequences S p . The code breaker can wait for the identical error sequences of marginal number of elements. If this repetition probability (p r ) can not be made zero to the code breaker, the system will not be perfectly secure. Simple modification will be required to reach to our goal.
Here S can be represented as a composition of three sub sequence of α, β and γ. So S = {γ γ γ γ γ α β γ γ γ γ γ γ β α γ....}, where p α = p β , but less than p γ , the probability of γ position in the sequence of S. Apart from the devices X and Y, we need another error introducing device Y which can produce error p z . Now error p z , p x and p y will be introduced in the sub sequences γ, α and β respectively to represent bit 0 and error p z , p y and p x will be introduced in the sub sequences γ, β and α respectively to represent bit 1, where p z = 1/2(p x + p y ). Then the extended key is: 
Again the probability of error in columns (also in rows) is same which is p z . Due to the presence of pseudo-elements (position of γ), code breaker's marginal statistics will have to be increased. Increasing the number of pseudo-elements, the probability of repetition (p r ) of error sequences of real elements (positions of α and β) can be made zero for arbitrarily long period of time to the eavesdropper.
It is trivial to mention that single sequence S can be a sequence of elements 0 or elements 0 and 1 also. Even two different random sequences of elements 0 and 1 can be used. When p z = 1/2, all the above type of uncorrupted sequences will essentially give random sequences of elements 0 and 1 in rows and in columns. The error introduction strategy is also applicable for quantum sequence but error has to be fixed for a fixed basis of measurement. We have seen that noise makes quantum cryptosystem insecure but in this approach, noise makes our classical and quantum cryptosystems perfectly secure. However at present, the use of quantum states in cryptography will be impractical. It will reduce the bit rate and distance of implementation, because of the non-existence of quantum repeater. But theoretical study on quantum cryptography remains to be interesting. It can lead to new new quantum games and also broaden our understanding of cryptography and quantum mechanics. The practical point of view, needless to say, classical system will be suitable. Moreover, at transmitting and receiving centre, we have to use classical information processing technique to control the classical devices to speed up communications.
To get the flavour of the efficiency of this system, let us assume p z = 1/2, p x = 1/4 and p y = 3/4 and the numbers of γ, α and β are 10 4 , 10 2 and 10 2 respectively i.e. p γ : p α : p β = 100 : 1 : 1. So code breaker's minimum statistics should be greater than 100. The probability of repetition (p r ) of error sequences of real elements will be less than 2 −100 . Hence 2 100 bits will be perfectly secure (p r = 0 for 100 elements). Using 10 9 pulses/sec, absolutely secure ∼ 10 5 bit/sec can be transmitted over 10
17 years ! The practical advantage of this system is that secure message can be directly transmitted. As noisy apparatus is preferable, secure communications might be economical.
